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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Carmine Avellino, a member of the Lucchese Crime Family, was
indicted by a federal grand jury and charged with eight offenses, including
racketeering and murder.2 The main witness against Avellino was Alphonso
D’Arco, a former boss of the Lucchese Family who had entered into a cooperation
agreement with the government in 1991.3 D’Arco had testified at several trials and
before at least one grand jury.4 His testimony proved pivotal in the 1992 trial of
Vittorio Amuso, a former head of the Lucchese family,5 and would eventually prove
important in the 1997 trial of Vincent Gigante, the boss of the larger and more
powerful Genovese group.6 Law enforcement officials, and the press, reveled in
D’Arco’s exposure of the notorious crime ring and the resulting convictions of many
of its officers and associates. Significantly less attention was paid to the way
D’Arco’s testimony was obtained.
1
J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1999; B.S., University of
California, Davis, 1996. This note is dedicated to my parents and my brothers. Thank you for
your support and encouragement.
2

United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 1998).

3

Id.

4

Id. at 251-52.

5

Life Term for Boss of Lucchese Family, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1992, at A4.

6

Joseph P. Fried, Ex-Mobster Testifies That Gigante Backed a Plot to Kill Gotti, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 1997, at B1.
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D’Arco became a federal witness after Amuso stripped him of his authority, and
he became afraid that the Lucchese family was plotting to kill him.7 By cooperating,
he obtained immunity from prosecution for ten of his relatives and in-laws.8 D’Arco
himself was allowed to plead guilty to RICO conspiracy and was promised a
sentence of no more than twenty years, despite his leadership of a Cosa Nostra crime
family and his array of acknowledged offenses.9 The government also reserved the
right to adjust his sentence downward if his cooperation proved “satisfactory.”10 The
prosecution of Avellino and many of his cohorts was successful, but even the court
had to note D’Arco’s powerful incentive to lie when presented with such a package.11
In spite of advances in scientific and statistical evidence, the success of a
criminal prosecution continues to hinge primarily on witness testimony. Such
evidence is difficult to come by, especially in the case of more sophisticated
criminals or defendants who commit crimes through syndicates that insulate them
from the relevant actus reus. Therefore, prosecutors must often look to other
criminals for case-building testimony.
Eliciting testimony from such witnesses often requires that a “deal” be struck,
whereby the government promises the guilty witness some degree of leniency for his
cooperation. “Bargaining” for witness testimony in this fashion has long been
recognized as a legitimate, necessary practice.12 However, the ramifications of such
agreements have always caused concern for those involved with defendants’ rights,
as the cooperating witness has a strong incentive to commit perjury to reap the full
benefit of the “contract.” This is especially true now that agreements are becoming
more liberal with respect to what the government may offer the cooperating witness,
what the witness is obligated to do in return, and how the witness is to suffer in the
event he fails to perform or fails to secure the desired effect. Clearly the most
important safeguard against false testimony is the defendant’s right to cross-examine
the cooperating witness as to bias. The defendant’s discretion to probe into
cooperation agreements, however, is not on par with the government’s increasing
discretion in what it may offer a criminal witness in exchange for his testimony.
This note explores the risk that a criminal witness will lie on the stand when he
testifies pursuant to a cooperation agreement. Section II is a history of cooperation
agreements and how the permissible scope of such agreements has been curbed in
the interests of defendants’ rights. Section III examines the practice as it exists

7

Michael Marriott, Mob Informer Questioned on Life of Lies, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1992,
at A4.
8

Avellino, 136 F.3d at 259.

9

Id. at 251, 259.

10

Id. at 251.

11

Id. at 259.

12

See, e.g., Ingram v. Prescott, 149 So. 369, 370 (Fla. 1933) (“From the earliest times, it
has been found necessary, for the detection and punishment of crime, for the state to resort to
the criminals themselves for testimony with which to convict their confederates in
crime. . . .Therefore, on the ground of public policy, it has been uniformly held that a state
may contract with a criminal for his exemption from prosecution if he shall honestly and fairly
make a full disclosure of the crime, whether the party testified against is convicted, or not.”).
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today, and how, in spite of the risk of perjury, state and federal prosecutors are being
given increasing discretion in drafting cooperation agreements. In section IV, the
“safeguards” available to the defendant which test the veracity of allegedly-biased
testimony are discussed. The conclusion is that the methods available to defendants
for scrutinizing allegedly-biased testimony do not offset the risk of perjury created
by government cooperation agreements, but the veracity of that testimony can be
more sufficiently scrutinized through broader cross-examination.
II. HISTORY OF COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
In early common law, an accomplice’s motive to lie in a criminal trial was
extreme, as his fate hinged on the outcome of the defendant’s trial. Prior to the 18th
century, when a person indicted for a capital offense was arraigned, he had the
option of either confessing before he pleaded, and appealing to the court’s mercy, or
accusing another of being an accomplice in the crime in order to obtain a pardon.13
Under the second option, “approvement,” the accusing witness was entitled to a
pardon as a matter of law if his testimony resulted in conviction of the accomplice.14
If the alleged accomplice was acquitted, however, the witness himself was
executed.15 Another practice in use during the age of approvement permitted an
accused to receive equitable right to a pardon by fully confessing his crime and
revealing his accomplices.16 However, the criminal who stepped forward could not
be the principal actor, and his testimony had to result in conviction.17
The practice of trading pardons for convictions evolved into a system where
pardons were granted in exchange for complete, truthful testimony, regardless of the
trial’s outcome.18 Testimony so obtained was reportedly initially challenged in
seventeenth century treason cases, but courts nonetheless deemed it competent,
though of diminished credibility.19 This view was incorporated into standard

13

The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 599 (1878).

14

Id.

15

Id. The doctrine of approvement had met with severe criticism prior to its obsolescence.
Chief Justice Hale wrote, “The truth is that more mischief hath come to good men, by these
kinds of approvements by false accusations of desperate villains, than benefit to the public by
the discovery and convicting of real offenders.” Graham Hughes, Agreements for
Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, n.19 (1992) (quoting MATTHEW HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 226 (1678)).
16

The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. at 600 (“Where the accomplice has made a full and fair
confession of the whole truth and is admitted as a witness for the crown, the practice is, if he
act fairly and openly and discover the whole truth, though he is not entitled of right to a
pardon, yet the usage, the lenity, and the practice of the court is to stop the prosecution against
the accomplice, the understanding being that he has an equitable title to a recommendation for
the king’s mercy.”).
17

Hughes, supra note 15, at 7-8

18

Neil B. Eisenstadt, Let’s Make a Deal: A Look at United States v. Dailey and
Prosecutor-Witness Cooperation Agreements, 67 B.U. L. REV. 749, 761 (1987).
19

Id.
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treatises on criminal law, evidence, and procedure, all of which helped shape modern
American jurisprudence.20
III. THE MOTIVE TO LIE
Significantly, the Supreme Court in The Whiskey Cases articulated no
requirement of judicial approval for cooperation agreements. In fact, the Court
explicitly recognized the prosecutor’s right to unilaterally enter into such agreements
as he saw fit so that he might efficiently conduct any given criminal prosecution.21
Modern cases cite the Separation of Powers doctrine in reaffirming this policy.22
Thus, the courts may intervene when a cooperation agreement compromises a
defendant’s Constitutional rights or when approval is needed for a sentencing
arrangement. Otherwise, the prosecutor has wide latitude in who he may bargain
with and what terms he may offer.23
A. Discretion of the Prosecutor in Selecting His Cooperating Witnesses
The prosecutor has plenary authority to choose which defendants will be charged
and which will be offered a “deal” in exchange for cooperation.24 As a protector of
the public interest, the prosecutor is bound to neutralize the largest number of units
possible of dangerousness and culpability, expressed in terms of criminal behavior.25
When the case against a group of defendants is flimsy, he must engage in a utilitarian
calculation whereby the relative dangerousness and culpability of each defendant is
evaluated.26 He then may offer favorable treatment to certain suspects in exchange
for testimony against their more dangerous cohorts.27 Except as hereafter provided,
20

Id. at 762.

21

The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. at 603 (“Consequently it is regarded as the province of the
public prosecutor and not of the court to determine whether or not an accomplice, who is
willing to criminate himself and his associates in guilt, shall be called and examined for the
State. Of all others, the prosecutor is best qualified to determine that question, and he alone is
supposed to know what other evidence can be adduced to prove the criminal charge.”).
22

See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1210 (1983) (prosecutorial discretion grounded in separation of powers doctrine). See
also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive
authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .”).
23

Eisenstadt, supra note 18, at 764-65.

24

Hughes, supra note 15, at 12.

25

Id. at 14.

26

Id. at 15.

27

The United States Department of Justice recognizes the “utilitarian” approach as a
legitimate practice. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, Part F (1980), provides, in relevant
part:
1. Except as hereafter provided, the attorney for the government may, with supervisory
approval, enter into a non-prosecution agreement in exchange for a person’s cooperation
when, in his judgment, the person’s timely cooperation appears to be necessary to the public
interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or would not be
effective.
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the attorney for the government may, with supervisory approval, enter into a nonprosecution agreement in exchange for a person’s cooperation when, in his
judgment, the person’s timely cooperation appears to be necessary to the public
interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or
would not be effective.
Although commentators view the utilitarian approach as the correct one,28 the
prosecutor’s degree of control is a cause for concern because he may grant leniency
to a witness with no compunction about lying. For example, in 1992 the federal
government entered into a plea agreement with underboss Salvatore “Sammy the
Bull” Gravano for testimony against John Gotti and dozens of other Gambino crime
family members.29 Gotti was convicted of murder and racketeering and sentenced to
life in prison without the possibility of parole.30 By contrast, Gravano spent less than
three years in prison, despite his participation in nineteen murders and countless
other crimes.31 Gravano claimed he cooperated with the government to “turn [his]
life around,” and “[get] away from what [he] was doing.”32 Even assuming
Gravano’s proclamations were true,33 they hardly made his testimony inherently
trustworthy.
B. The Nature of Cooperation Agreements
Just as the prosecutor has authority to select his cooperating witnesses, he also
has broad discretion in what he may offer for their testimony.34 The Gravano
example clearly demonstrates how much criminals facing harsh penalties can gain if
given the opportunity to cooperate. Thus, once the prosecutor enters into a
cooperation agreement with a witness, that witness has a strong incentive to ensure
that, at least in the eyes of the prosecutor, he has performed his end of the bargain.
The witness consequently has a strong motive to proffer “valuable” evidence, even if
none exists.

28
See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 15 (“This utilitarian approach is surely the correct
one.”).
29
Arnold H. Lubasch, Gravano Ends Testimony After 9 Exhaustive Days, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1992, at A5.
30

PETER MAAS, UNDERBOSS: SAMMY THE BULL GRAVANO’S STORY OF LIFE IN THE MAFIA
296 (1997).
31

Lubasch, supra note 29, at A5.

32

Id.

33

John Gotti’s defense attorneys portrayed Gravano as a career criminal who would do and
say anything to avoid spending the rest of his life in prison. Id. Further, in his biography,
Gravano recalls deciding to testify after his brother-in-law visited him in prison, told him he
would “go down on this case,” and suggested that he cooperate. MAAS, supra note 30, at 285.
34

Eisenstadt, supra note 18, at 763.
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1. The Prosecutor’s Reward to the Witness
Prosecutors have many methods at their disposal for inducing a witness to testify.
In United States v. Smentek,35 the government promised to bring the cooperation of
the principal witnesses, convicted drug dealers, to the attention of the sentencing
judge.36 The key witness in Giglio v. United States,37 a co-conspirator in an
operation to pass forged money orders, testified in exchange for immunity from
prosecution. In Campbell v. Reed,38 the cooperation agreement set forth that, in
exchange for the accomplice-witness’ testimony against the defendant, several
charges against him would be dismissed and the prosecution would recommend a
sentence of only two years.39 In Sanders v. United States,40 the key witness, an
informer for the Iowa Division of Narcotic & Drug Enforcement, was regularly
given subsistence payments. The court validated the payments, but reversed the
defendant’s conviction on three counts only because the arrangement was not
brought out at trial.41
A criminal defendant facing extensive jail time naturally has a strong incentive to
seek ways to limit or escape punishment. The government has the power to implore
the sentencing tribunal for leniency, limit terms of imprisonment, drop charges or, in
limited cases, make monetary payments in exchange for cooperation. Hence, to a
certain degree, the government bribes suspects from a position of considerable
power, using the threat of incarceration as a bargaining chip. A criminal defendant
who engages in like behavior is guilty of a felony.42
In United States v. Singleton,43 the defense raised this argument to challenge the
admissibility of a prosecution witness’ testimony. The defendant, Sonya Singleton,
alleged the government violated section 201(c)(2) of Title 18 of the United States

35
United States v. Smentek, No. 81 CR 664-10, 90 C2079, 90 C2290, 1991 WL 101665 at
*1 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 1991).
36

See also United States v. Araujo, 539 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1976) (co-conspirators in
money-laundering operation testified against defendant in exchange for the government’s
promise to bring the witness’ cooperation to the attention of the sentencing judge).
37

405 U.S. 150 (1972).

38

594 F.2d 4 (4th Cir. 1979).

39

Ten separate charges were pending against the defendant at the time of his trial: two
counts of second-degree burglary, three counts of felonious breaking or entering, and five
counts of felonious larceny. Upon his conviction, he received a sentence of 43 years. Id. at 6,
n.1.
40

541 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1976).

41

Id. at 192, 194.

42

18 U.S.C. §1512(b)(1) provides, in relevant part: “Whoever knowingly uses intimidation
or physical force, or threatens another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading
conduct toward another person, with intent to influence the testimony of any person in an
official proceeding . . . shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (1994).
43

144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998).
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Code by promising leniency to a witness in return for his testimony against her.44
Section 201(c)(2) provides:
Whoever . . . directly or indirectly gives, offers or promises anything of
value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or
affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, . . . authorized by the laws
of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony . . . shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.45
In exchange for his testimony against Singleton, the government had promised
Napoleon Douglas, a co-conspirator, (1) not to prosecute him for certain crimes then
under investigation; (2) to inform the district court of the nature and extent of his
cooperation prior to his sentencing; and (3) to advise the Mississippi parole board of
the nature and extent of his cooperation.46 Singleton appealed her conviction,
asserting that the government had promised Douglas “something of value”—
leniency—in exchange for his testimony, in violation of section 201(c)(2).47
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed.48 The court reasoned that
“anything of value” need not be limited to items reducible to monetary or tangible
value, and that “it is difficult to imagine anything more valuable than personal
physical freedom.”49 The court continued: “Although the information promised by
the government would certainly not guarantee Mr. Douglas’s release, it was an
invaluable step toward that end.”50 The government’s intervention on Douglas’s
behalf was therefore of great value, and its promise not to prosecute him for certain
offenses was even more valuable: “Besides guaranteed physical freedom he was
guaranteed freedom from the burden of defending himself from the stigma of
prosecution and conviction as well.”51 The government’s conduct was therefore
“covered by the plain language and meaning of section 201(c)(2).”52
The Tenth Circuit vacated the Singleton opinion nine days later and granted
rehearing en banc.53 Further, other circuits have almost uniformly rejected the Tenth
Circuit’s Singleton ruling or, in the alternative, deemed it uncontrolling or legally

44

Id. at 1344.

45

18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1994).

46

Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 1350.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1350. The court also noted that Douglas clearly subjectively
valued the government’s promises, as they were all he bargained for in return for his testimony
and guilty plea. The court regarded his testimony that he wanted the government’s assistance
to help “everything work out for [him]” as proof to that effect. Id. at 1350-1.
52

Id. at 1351.

53

Id. at 1360.
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distinguishable.54 Prosecutors therefore continue to retain wide latitude in what
inducements they may offer a criminal witness in exchange for their testimony.
Section 201(c)(2), while binding against criminal defendants, does not inhibit
prosecutors’ long-standing right to “bribe” a witness for cooperation.
2. The Witness’ Obligations
In denouncing cooperation agreements as unduly prejudicial to the defendant, the
Singleton court focused on the consideration the cooperating witness was to receive
in exchange for his testimony: the prosecution’s specific promises to drop charges
and to speak on behalf of Douglas violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) because such
promises comprised “anything of value.” The court did not address the fact that, to a
certain degree, Douglas’ reward was contingent on the “quality” of his testimony.55
Yet it is the contingent nature of cooperation agreements that arguably gives the
criminal witness the greatest incentive to lie.56
Cooperation agreements are, in effect, contracts for services that are executory on
both sides.57 Pursuant to some agreements, the witness’ obligation to the state lasts
several months, or even years.58 The prosecution must therefore retain the power to
enforce the agreement for as long as necessary to assure that it ultimately receives
the benefit of its bargain.
54

See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, No. 98 CR. 4 (JGK), 1998 WL 598098 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
8, 1998) (federal statute does not apply to the Government unless the Government is expressly
included within its scope; because §201(c)(2) does not expressly include the Government
within its scope, it cannot be applied to the Government); United States v. Allen, No. 97-CV4698, 1998 WL 575264 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 1998) (“Singleton is not the law in this Circuit and
is no longer the law in the Tenth Circuit”); United States v. Reid, No. 3:98CR64, 1998 WL
481459 (E.D. Va. July 28, 1998) (Section 201(c)(2) does not apply to the U.S. Attorney);
United States v. Arana, No. 95-CR-80272, 1998 WL 420673 (E.D. Mich. July 24, 1998)
(Application of Section 201(c)(2) to the government would create an absurdity); United States
v. McGuire, No. 98-40047-01 DES, 1998 WL 564234 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 1998) (Singleton
opinion not controlling). But see United States v. Lowery, Jr., 15 F. Supp.2d 1348 (S.D. Fl.
1998) (“Certainly, if testimony purchased by a defendant is tainted, testimony purchased by
the Executive Branch is no less tainted. The most logical construction of Section 201(c)(2),
therefore, is one that prohibits all agreements for testimony, irrespective of who enters into
them.”).
55

In exchange for Douglas’ testimony, the government promised to advise the sentencing
court and the Mississippi parole board “of the nature and extent of the cooperation provided.”
Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344. Clearly, the prosecution’s communications to these agencies
were determined in part by how “complete” Douglas’ testimony was and how “useful” against
the defendant that testimony proved to be.
56
In United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980), the court declared it
“obvious that promises of immunity or leniency premised on cooperation in a particular case
may provide a strong inducement to falsify in that case.”
57

Hughes, supra note 15, at 2.

58

See, e.g., United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1985) (Key witnesses against
defendants entered into plea agreement in March of 1984. Defendants were not tried until
May and June, and government anticipated a number of other prosecutions in a number of
jurisdictions extending over a number of years); United States v. Stantini, 85 F.3d 9 (2d Cir.
1996) (Murder suspects indicted in April, 1993 for murder. Key witness entered into
cooperation agreement with government in November, 1991.).
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Courts are taking an increasingly liberal view as to what exactly that “benefit”
may be. Some courts have held that the government can require no more than “full
and truthful testimony” before it is obliged to perform.59 Most courts, however,
permit the extent of the government’s favors to be determined, at least in part, by the
quality or utility of the witness’ testimony from the government’s perspective.60
Clauses to that effect may even be written into the relevant cooperation agreement.
Thus, the cooperating witness may be confronted with a “sliding scale” by which he
secures an increasing degree of leniency in exchange for increasingly incriminating
testimony. Under such circumstances, the pressure on the witness to please is
extreme and there is a plausible risk that the witness will commit perjury to do it.
In United States v. Dailey, the defendant sought to exclude the testimony of three
witnesses for precisely this reason.61 Dailey was charged with organizing and
managing a continuing criminal enterprise to import and distribute marijuana.62 The
key witnesses against him were three operators of a smaller drug enterprise who had
previously been arrested and indicted.63 In March of 1984, witnesses Frappier and
Minnig entered into plea agreements which made explicit the relationship between
the effectiveness of their testimony and the sentences they would ultimately
receive.64 Dailey contended that the contingent nature of the agreement had
“provided such an inducement for the accomplices to testify falsely that their
testimony should be stricken from the record.”65
In the trial of Dailey’s codefendant, Salvatore Caruana, the district court denied
an identical motion to strike, holding that the standard procedural safeguards—
having the agreement read to the jury, allowing defense counsel to cross-examine the
witnesses with respect to the agreements, and instructing the jury to scrutinize the

59
See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1133 (1st Cir. 1981) (testimony might
be tainted if leniency is dependent on evaluation by the government).
60

See, e.g., United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1983) (no due process
violation found where witness’ sentence recommendation contingent on the acceptance of the
adequacy of his cooperation); United States v. Edwards, 549 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1977)
(testimony of informant permitted even though his reward was contingent on final outcome of
his undercover work); United States v. Valle-Ferrer, 739 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1984)
(informant’s anticipated receipt of $1,000 if testimony resulted in conviction did not render
him incompetent to testify).
61

Dailey, 759 F.2d at 193.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id. at 194. (Paragraph 5, the relevant provision of the agreement, provided: “The
defendant agrees to fully cooperate, as defined in Paragraph 2. If, at the time of sentencing on
the Maine indictment, the defendant has fully cooperated with the United States, . . . the
Government will recommend a specific term of imprisonment which does not exceed twenty
(20) years and, depending principally upon the value to the Government of the defendant’s
cooperation, the Government, in its sole discretion, may recommend a sentence of ten (10)
years; . . . . If, at the time of sentencing on the Maine indictment, . . . the Court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has not fully cooperated . . . then the court
shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment of thirty-five (35) years.)”
65

Id.
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accomplices’ testimony with care—were sufficient to protect the defendant’s due
process rights.66 The district court in Dailey reached the opposite conclusion and
excluded the witness testimony, but the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed, citing three reasons:67 First, the terms “value” and “benefit” in the
agreement were ambiguous, distinguishing this case from that relied upon by the
defense in its argument for exclusion.68 Second, the government had a valid interest
in drafting a plea bargain certain enough to assure the witnesses’ compliance, but
contingent enough to persuade the witnesses to continue cooperating “until the fund
of knowledge they held had been completely tapped and utilized in the investigation
and prosecution of their alleged confederates.”69 Finally, the court felt the provision
requiring the imposition of a thirty-five year sentence for failure to give “full
cooperation” adequately protected the defendant against perjury.70
The Dailey court then reviewed a number of cases in which key testimony had
been obtained through contingent plea agreements.71 In all the cases relied upon, the
testimony was admitted despite the acknowledged risk of perjury created by the
agreement’s terms.72 The court in United States v. Kimble explained:
The jury had both the power and duty to determine whether [the
accomplice] was to be believed in whole or in part. The jury obviously
believed him, at least to the extent that it returned the guilty verdicts on
two counts. The plea agreement, prior statements and prior criminal
record all went to the weight of [the accomplice’s] testimony, not its
admissibility.73

66

Dailey, 759 F.2d at 194.

67

Id. at 194, 200.

68

Dailey relied on United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated en
banc, id. at 1533, to support his motion to strike. In Waterman, the plea agreement included a
government promise to recommend a two-year reduction in the accomplice’s sentence if his
“truthful testimony led to further indictments. . . .” Id. at 1530. The government’s
requirement of this specific occurrence was held to be a violation of due process. Id. at 1531.
69

Dailey, 759 F.2d at 197.

70

Id. The court noted that “full cooperation” was defined in the agreement as the giving of
“complete and honest testimony.” The agreement provided that failure to give “full
cooperation” would result in a sentence of 35 years. “Lying, therefore, appears to carry with it
a risk of being caught in the lie and consequently receiving 35 years for failing to give honest
testimony, rather than ten years for providing valuable information.” Id.
71

Id. at 198-200.

72

Among the many cases listed by the court were: United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165,
1168-69 (2d Cir. 1970) (court rejected due process challenge to the admission of testimony
from two accomplices who had yet to be sentenced); United States v. Borman, 437 F.2d 44,
45-46 (2d Cir. 1971) (trial court did not err by allowing testimony of unsentenced accomplice
who had pled guilty, where jury was properly cautioned as to the witness’ credibility); United
States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1983) (testimony of accomplice permitted where
cooperation agreement provided for a sentence of 20 years if his cooperation was considered
adequate by the government). See also supra note 61.
73

Kimble, 719 F.2d at 1257 (emphasis added).
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The Dailey court summarily applied the same reasoning and deemed the
testimony admissible. The court acknowledged the risk of perjury inherent in the
contingent agreement, but deemed it no greater than it was in Kimble or other like
cases.74 Finally, the court concluded that the “traditional safeguards” against
perjury—reading the agreement to the jury, cross-examination of the cooperating
witness, and cautionary jury instructions from the court regarding the testimony of
accomplices—were adequate to protect Dailey’s rights.75
The assurances against perjury cited in Dailey and Kimble are clearly overrated.
Criminal defendants enter into cooperation agreements to reduce or avoid the
penalties for their crimes. When the penalty at issue is jail time, the witness testifies
to preserve his personal, physical freedom—essentially, his life.76 Courts have
repeatedly acknowledged the witness’ strong motive to lie under such
circumstances.77 On the other hand, the witness’ testimony does not seem to be
comparably swayed toward truthfulness by the threat of being caught in a lie and
charged with perjury.78 Therefore, the efficacy of protection from false testimony
apparently hinges on the Dailey “traditional safeguards,” and particularly, on the
defendant’s right to cross-examination. However, while the government’s discretion
in drafting cooperation agreements has vastly expanded, the methods a defendant
may use to expose a witness’ possible biases have not kept pace.
IV. FLUSHING OUT FALSE TESTIMONY
A witness who testifies pursuant to a cooperation agreement is furnished with
incentives to lie beyond his personal biases and reservations. When the government
either creates or sharply enhances its own witness’ motivation to lie, adversarial
fairness requires special safeguards to protect defendants. Dailey listed the
“traditional safeguards” as follows:

74

Dailey, 759 F.2d at 200.

75

Id. at 200.

76

See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1350 (The obvious purpose of the government’s proposed
actions was to reduce his jail time, and it is difficult to imagine anything more valuable than
personal physical freedom.).
77

See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) (“It is
difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced
sentence . . . .”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988); United States v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673,
680 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A violation of trust which is influenced by the offer of an intangible
service is no less damaging . . . than if the influence was in the form of a cash kickback.”);
United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980) (“We think it obvious that
promises of immunity or leniency premised on cooperation in a particular case may provide a
strong inducement to falsify in that case.”).
78

President Clinton’s false statements in Jones v. Clinton, 858 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Ark.
1994), regarding his sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky, indicate that the threat of a
perjury charge is not sufficient to ensure truthful testimony when the witness knows the truth
will condemn him. Furthermore, for the key witness in United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353
(2d Cir. 1995) and United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993), the penalty for
perjury was clearly insignificant compared to the penalties for the key witness, a former mafia
underboss, sought to avoid by testifying.
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The agreements should be read to the jury and made available during
deliberations; defense counsel may cross-examine the accomplices at
length about the agreements; and the jury should be given the standard
cautionary instruction concerning the testimony of accomplices and a
special cautionary instruction concerning the nature of each accomplice’s
contingent agreement and the risk it creates, particularly in instances
where the accomplice’s testimony cannot be corroborated.79
The court in Dailey considered these measures sufficient to protect the defendant
in that case. However, defense attorneys do not have as much discretion in the
application of such measures as prosecutors have in drafting cooperation agreements.
A. Discovery of the Cooperation Agreement
As a matter of due process, the prosecution may be compelled to disclose any
exculpatory information to the defense, including the existence of witness
cooperation agreements.80 Defense attorneys request the details of such agreements,
and the cooperating witnesses’ criminal records, as a regular part of preparation.81
Federal prosecutors generally disclose such agreements even absent a specific
request.82
The Supreme Court, however, eroded the Brady principle in United States v.
Bagley.83 In 1977, Bagley was indicted on fifteen charges of narcotics and firearms
violations. Before trial, defense counsel filed a discovery motion requesting, among
other things, “[t]he names and addresses of witnesses that the government intends to
call at trial, the prior criminal records of witnesses, and any deals, promises or
inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony.”84
In response, the government disclosed a series of affidavits signed by its two
principle witnesses, but did not disclose that any deals or inducements had been
made.85 After Bagley’s conviction, however, he discovered copies of ATF contracts,
signed by the key witnesses, stating that the government would pay the witnesses
commensurate with the information furnished.86
The Supreme Court upheld Bagley’s conviction, reasoning:
79

Dailey, 759 F.2d at 200.

80

Brady v. Maryland, 383 U.S. 83 (1963).

81

Eisenstadt, supra note 18, at 29.

82

Id. at 65, n.115.

83

473 U.S. 667 (1985).

84

Id. at 669-70.

85

Id. at 670.

86

Id. at 671.

The printed portion of the forms stated that the vendor “will provide” information to
the ATF and that “upon receipt of such information by the Regional Director, Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, or his representative, and upon the
accomplishment of the objective sought to be obtained by the use of such information
to the satisfaction of said Regional Director, the United States will pay to said vendor
a sum commensurate with the services and information rendered.”
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The holding in Brady v. Maryland requires disclosure only of evidence
that is both favorable to the accused and material either to guilt or
punishment. A fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit
in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence
might have affected the outcome of the trial.87
Reversal was therefore not warranted because “the disclosure would have had no
effect upon [the district court’s] finding that [Bagley] was guilty of the offenses for
which he was convicted.”88
Commentators have attacked Bagley as indefensible in light of the specific
requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause.89 Even if the ruling is
constitutionally sound, it grants the prosecution a clear advantage over the defense:
the government may “induce a witness to lie, fail to disclose the inducements, and
then escape reversal on the grounds that disclosure would not have produced a
different result.”90 The defendant may therefore be deprived of this opportunity to
challenge the veracity of the testimony.
B. Cautionary Instructions to the Jury
When a witness testifies pursuant to a cooperation agreement, the court must
inform the jury of the exact nature of the agreement and instruct the jury to weigh the
accomplice’s testimony with care.91 In most instances, the instruction represents “no
more than a commonsense recognition that an accomplice may have a special
interest in testifying, thus casting doubt upon his veracity.”92 Moreover, the
instruction must be worded in a way that conforms with the burden of proof at trial.93

87

Id. at 674-75.

88

Id. at 673.

89

See, e.g., Eisenstadt, supra note 18, at 29 (“Confrontation, the right to the effective
assistance of counsel in pursuing confrontation, and independent general due process
considerations demand that in all cases of cooperation the government make full pretrial
disclosure to the defense.”).
90

Id.

91

United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Cir. 1970) (“What is important in this
situation is that . . . the judge instruct the jury that in weighing the testimony of such witnesses
they give adequate attention to the motives which may underlie such testimony.”); United
States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 200 (1st Cir. 1985) (“[T]he jury should be given the standard
cautionary instruction concerning the testimony of accomplices and a special cautionary
instruction concerning the nature of each accomplice’s contingent agreement and the risk that
it creates . . . .”).
92

Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 103 (1972).

93

The instruction in United States v. Dailey provided, in pertinent part: “Frappier, Minnig,
[and] Tindall . . . are accomplices to the events about which they testified. And the testimony
of an accomplice must always be scrutinized by a jury with great care and great caution. . . .
And you should not convict a defendant on the unsupported testimony of an accomplice unless
you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accomplice is telling the truth.” Dailey, 759
F.2d at 200 (emphasis added). The instruction in Cool v. United States, in which the criminal
witness testified to exonerate the defendant, read: “If the testimony carries conviction and you
are convinced it is true beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should give it the same effect as
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The benefit the defendant derives from the court’s cautionary instructions to the
jury is uncertain. Although particular attention is called to the contingent nature of
some cooperation agreements,94 the present form of the warning does not convey the
extent of a witness’ incentive to lie to reap that agreement’s full benefits. Further,
courts do not mention how easily a cooperating witness may fabricate testimony
when, as is often the case, that witness is the sole source of inculpatory evidence.95
The defense will likely make these points vigorously on summation, but that is no
substitute for a charge by the court.96
C. Cross-Examination by the Defense
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to confront witnesses testifying against him.97 The Supreme
Court has interpreted this guarantee as affording the defendant the right to crossexamine witnesses about the matters relating to their biases, interests, or motives to
make false or misleading statements.98 Cross-examination is thus the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony is
tested.99 Further, only cross-examination can fully expose the gravity of a
cooperation agreement and the strength of a witness’ compulsion to lie to reap its
benefits.
Courts have long recognized that in order to counterbalance the witness’
incentive to lie, the defendant must be given wide latitude as to what questions he
may ask regarding that witness’ possible biases. In Alford v. United States,100 the
trial court did not permit the defense to ask a witness whether his detention by

you would to a witness not in any respect implicated in the alleged crime . . . .” Cool, 409
U.S. at 102 (emphasis added). The instruction in Cool was found to be in error because it
reduced the level of proof necessary for the Government to carry its burden: “Indeed, where,
as here, the defendant’s case rests almost entirely on accomplice testimony, the effect of the
judge’s instructions is to require the defendant to establish his innocence beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 104.
94
The relevant instruction in Dailey reads: “With respect to Frappier, Minnig and Tindall,
particularly keep in mind in judging their testimony and their credibility that the government
has the power to confer or withhold future advantages, depending on the value of their
cooperation.” Dailey, 759 F.2d at 200.
95
See, e.g., United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Avellino,
136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1997).
96

Eisenstadt, supra note 18, at 33.

97

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”).
98

See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (“Our cases construing the
[confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of crossexamination.”); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (“Confrontation means more than
being allowed to confront the witnesses physically.”).
99

Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.

100

282 U.S. 687 (1931).
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federal authorities might have influenced his testimony.101 In reversing, the Supreme
Court emphasized the importance of allowing the defendant to “place the witness in
his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to the test,
without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them.”102 The Court also stressed that
because the source of a witness’ biases, if any, is uncertain, cross-examination is
necessarily exploratory. It was therefore essential that “reasonable latitude be given
the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what fact a
reasonable cross-examination might develop.”103
More recent decisions have adhered to these principles. In Davis v. Alaska,104 the
Supreme Court held that refusal to allow the defendant to cross-examine the key
prosecution witness about his probationary status constituted a violation of the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.105 The Court noted that
“exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of
the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”106 The Court further held
that simply allowing the defense to ask a witness on cross-examination whether he
was biased, without permitting further exploration “to make a record from which to
argue why [the witness] might have been biased” prevents effective crossexamination.107 The Court described the result as “constitutional error of the first
magnitude,” uncurable even by a showing of lack of prejudice.108
The Court has thus explicitly recognized that cross-examination plays a key role
in counterbalancing the risk of perjury by criminal witnesses, and that defendants
must therefore be given wide latitude during cross-examination to ensure a fair trial.
The courts of the several states have overwhelmingly reached the same conclusion.109
Nevertheless, trial courts retain broad discretion to limit the scope of crossexamination “based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice,
101
Id. at 690 (“[I]f the witness had been convicted of a felony that fact might be proved,
but not that he was detained in custody.”).
102

Id. at 693.

103

Id. at 692.

104

415 U.S. 308 (1974).

105

Id. at 320. The crucial witness for the prosecution was on probation after having been
adjudicated a delinquent for burglarizing two cabins. Alaska law permitted the exclusion of
the witness’ convictions because of his status as a juvenile at the time of the offenses. The
defendant sought to demonstrate that the witness testified out of fear or concern of possible
jeopardy to his probation: “Not only might [the witness] have made a hasty and faulty
identification of petitioner to shift suspicion away from himself. . . but [he] might have been
subject to undue pressure from the police and made his identifications under fear of possible
probation revocation.” Id. at 310-11.
106

Id. at 317.

107

Id. at 318.

108

Id. See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (trial court’s prohibition of
inquiry into the possibility of bias on behalf of a prosecution witness regarding dismissal of a
pending charge violated defendant’s right to confrontation).
109

Booth M. Ripke, Restricting The Right To Cross-Examine Witnesses For Bias, 56 MD.
L. REV. 793, 800-01 (1997).
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confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only
marginally relevant.”110 Further, reversal is warranted only where there has been
“clear abuse of discretion, and a showing of prejudice to the defendant.”111 The
defendant may thus be deprived of his right to expose a cooperating witness’
possible biases because, in the trial court’s opinion, other considerations outweigh
the defendant’s right to inquire into those biases.
Often, the trial court’s exercise of this discretion will not result in recognizable
prejudice to the defendant. In State v. McCall,112 the defendant was convicted of
second-degree reckless injury through the testimony of Robert Wade, the defendant’s
victim.113 The defendant attempted to impeach Wade by inquiring into an alleged
agreement between Wade and the prosecutor regarding recently dismissed charges
against him.114 The circuit court denied the defense permission to proceed with its
line of questioning, concluding that the proffered evidence was irrelevant and that its
limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the
issues and wasting time on collateral matters. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found
no error, citing three reasons: (1) the dismissal of the three charges did not affect
Wade’s testimony at trial;115 (2) the prosecutor had alternative, compelling reasons
for dismissing the charges;116 and (3) the defense was able to significantly attack
Wade’s credibility, notwithstanding the restriction on cross-examination.117 Clearly,
Wade’s veracity was sufficiently scrutinized even without evidence of the dismissed
charges.118
Nonetheless, many cases exist in which the trial court’s exercise of discretion has
resulted in clear prejudice to the defendant. In United States v. Parker,119 the trial
court barred cross-examination of a key witness regarding pending charges against
her for murdering her husband. The defendant argued on appeal that such cross110

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679.

111

United States v. Wood, 834 F.2d 1382, 1384 (8th Cir. 1987).

112

549 N.W.2d 418 (Wis. 1996).

113

Id. at 420.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 422 (The trial court noted the small difference between the statement Wade
delivered to the police immediately following the shooting and his testimony at trial.).
116

Id. at 422-23 (Wade was paralyzed by the gunshot wound inflicted by the defendant.
The prosecutor claimed he dismissed the charges against him because his incarceration would
be difficult, and his state prevented from committing similar crimes in the future.).
117
McCall, 202 549 N.W.2d at 423 at 41 (Defense counsel was able to note that Wade had
ten prior criminal convictions; he had been in prison and was an alcoholic; he had bought
cocaine from the defendant on more than one occasion; and he had been drinking all day and
had smoked cocaine prior to the shooting.).
118
See also United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (refusal to allow
government witness to answer question about whether she had to testify against defendant or
else lose her children as a result of her own conviction was not reversible error, because (1)
answer was speculative, and (2) any error was harmless, as the defense had previously elicited
the answer she sought).
119

133 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 1998).
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examination would have shown the witness had an incentive to slant her testimony to
receive favor in the pending case.120 The Court of Appeal found no error, reasoning,
“[the defendant] has presented no evidence that federal prosecutors agreed to give a
favorable recommendation for or intercede on behalf of [the witness] in the pending
state case.”121
Similarly, in United States v. Qualls,122 four key witnesses were government
narcotics agents who, at the time of the trial, were suspended from their positions as
a result of indictments brought against them. The defendant sought to cross-examine
the agents to show bias due to the possible favoritism to be given them by the
government in exchange for their testimony.123 The trial court barred inquiry into the
indictments, reasoning that it would lead to a trial of the witnesses rather than the
defendant.124 The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying primarily on the government’s
announcement that it had not entered into any bargains with the indicted agents.125
In United States v. Triplett,126 police searched a key witness’ home after he was
arrested for attempting to cash stolen money orders. The trial court did not permit
the defendants to cross-examine the witness about an alleged controlled substance
recovered during that search.127 The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that the
material was never identified as a controlled substance and the witness was never
charged with its possession.128 Further, the witness testified that he had not entered
into any agreement with the government which conditioned his testimony on
favorable treatment of future drug charges.129
The rulings in these cases unduly compromise the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation for several reasons. First, federal cases have recognized that a
criminal witness may have a motive to lie because of an implicit promise of leniency
from the government.130 Thus, in Parker and Qualls, the absence of a tangible
agreement would not have conclusively shown that no agreement in fact existed in
the eyes of the witness. Second, and more importantly, even when no promise of
leniency has been explicitly or implicitly made, a prosecution witness may be biased

120

Id. at 327.

121

Id.

122

500 F.2d 1238, 1239 (8th Cir. 1974).

123

Id. at 1240.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

104 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 1996).

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

See, e.g., McGeshick v. Fiedler, 3 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 1993) (witness testified that he
was told that if he cooperated, “maybe things would go easier for him,” although no clear
promises were made).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999

17

158

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:141

upon an expectation or hope of leniency in exchange for his testimony.131 Limiting
cross-examination to an exploration of explicit “deals” therefore denies the
defendant a full opportunity to bring witness biases to the attention of the fact-finder,
in clear violation of the confrontation clause.132
V. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
Clearly, one characteristic of cooperation agreements that has survived since its
birth is the witness’ motive to lie to secure the government’s favor. Although the
prosecutor’s broad discretion in selecting cooperating witnesses and drafting
agreements is problematic from the defendant’s point of view, cost-efficient
protection from perjury cannot be achieved by redacting the prosecutor’s power, for
two reasons. First, the risk of perjury presented by a cooperation agreement, though
concededly present, is outweighed by the benefit society reaps in the form of
convictions that could not have been realized without cooperating witness
testimony.133 Second, and more importantly, no matter who selects the testifying
witnesses in a criminal trial, it is impossible to predict their veracity with 100%
accuracy.
Only the defendant’s Sixth Amendment “safeguards” can sufficiently put that
veracity to the test. However, the first two safeguards—discovery of the cooperation
agreement and cautionary instructions to the jury by the court—merely call the
factfinder’s attention to the existence of the agreement and provide certain
restrictions on acceptance of the testimony, regardless of how the agreement or the
instruction is worded. Only the third safeguard, cross-examination, can expose how
much the testimony of a witness is influenced by government promises. Thus, to
offset the government’s increasing discretion in offering and drafting agreements, the
defense must be given greater discretion in the scope of its cross-examination.
Granting defendants such leeway, ironically, would require the courts to do
nothing more than give precedent its proper import. The Supreme Court in Alford v.
United States stressed the defendant’s right to “place the witness in his proper setting
and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to the test.”134 The Court
further stated that the trial court may exercise its reasonable judgment in determining
when a line of questioning is exhausted, but that there is no obligation to protect a
witness from being discredited.135 In Davis v. Alaska, the Court identified crossexamination as “the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the

131
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Evans, 512 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1986) (court recognized that
witness may have testified in favor of prosecution in order to receive favorable treatment in an
unrelated crime, even though prosecution had not made any agreements or promised to make
any agreements to that effect).
132

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 316-17 (1973). "The partiality of a witness is subject to
exploration at trial, and is ‘always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight
of his testimony.’ We have recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying
is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of crossexamination.”
133

See supra note 26.

134

Alford, 282 U.S. at 692.

135

Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
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truth of his testimony are tested.”136 Therefore, “[s]ubject always to the broad
discretion of the trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation,
the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the
witness’ perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been
allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.”137 Likewise, in Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, the Court noted that trial judges may limit cross-examination based on
“concerns about . . . harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’
safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”138 However,
the partiality of a witness is “always relevant as discrediting the witness and
affecting the weight of his testimony.”139
The rulings in State v. McCall140 and United States v. Morrison141 were not in
error because, in limiting the cross-examination, the trial courts adhered to these
principles. In McCall, the defendant sufficiently exposed the witness’ biases even
though he was not permitted to inquire into recently dismissed charges pending
against the witness.142 Inquiry into the charges would have been repetitive and a
waste of the court’s time. Likewise, in Morrison there was no error because the
defendant was able to expose the witness’ sources of bias in spite of the trial court’s
limitations on cross-examination.143 Again, further inquiry would have been
repetitive.
The rulings in United States v. Parker,144 United States v. Qualls,145 and United
States v. Triplett,146 by contrast, are problematic because the trial courts’ limitations
on cross-examination left the defendant no comparable means to scrutinize the
witnesses’ veracity. In each of those cases, the trial court limited cross-examination
because the defendant presented no clear evidence of an explicit agreement between
the government and the witness.147 No inquiry into implicit or expected promises
was permitted, and yet the existence of either one would have permitted the jury to
infer witness partiality. The courts in these cases apparently barred such inquiry not
for reasons of judicial economy or witness protection, but because, absent tangible
agreements, the source of bias was too speculative. Yet the Supreme Court has long

136

Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.

137

Id. (emphasis added).

138

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (emphasis added).

139

Davis, 415 U.S. at 316.

140

549 N.W.2d 418 (Wis. 1996).

141

98 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

142

See supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.

143

See supra note 119.

144

133 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 1998).

145

500 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1974).

146

104 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 1996).

147

See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
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recognized the legitimacy of cross-examination in situations where the source of
witness bias cannot be precisely known.148
The trial judge is to be afforded considerable discretion in determining what
evidence is relevant. Parker, Qualls, and Triplett make clear, however, that more
deference must be afforded the cross-examiner, particularly when no other evidence
of witness bias has been introduced or permitted. In order to comply with the Sixth
Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court, evidence of charges pending
against witnesses should be placed in front of the jury so that the jury may fully
assess the value of the witness’ testimony, regardless of the terms or existence of a
cooperation agreement. Such evidence is not “repetitive” or “unduly harassing.” On
the contrary, its exclusion denies the defendant his means of testing adverse
testimony, and consequently, his Constitutional right to confrontation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Inherent in all cooperation agreements is the risk that a criminal witness will
commit perjury in order to reap the fullest benefit of the bargain. This is especially
true when the government makes some or all of the reward contingent on a future
factor, such as the prosecutor’s “satisfaction” with the quality of the testimony.
Nevertheless, attacks on the government’s practice of entering such agreements have
rightly failed simply because the benefits of such agreements—increased conviction
of more dangerous criminals, and deterrence of other criminals because of the risk
their cohorts might one day turn against them—outweigh the cost to society of
deterring a criminal witness from committing perjury.
However, a criminal witness’ motive to lie is a genuine cause for concern. It
goes without saying that no method can be 100% effective in protecting a defendant
from perjured testimony. Nonetheless, the court and the defense have several
methods to scrutinize the testimony of any witness who arguably has an interest in
the outcome of the trial. Of these, the most important is cross-examination.
The defendant’s discretion in what questions he may ask a testifying witness on
cross-examination cannot completely offset the motive to lie the government
furnishes that witness through promises of leniency or immunity. Thorough crossexamination can, however, permit a jury to meaningfully appraise the truth of a
witness’ testimony. For that reason, courts must give the cross-examiner wider
latitude in what questions he may ask, absent repetitive evidence or undue
harassment. A tangible risk of witness perjury will nonetheless remain, but that cost
will be easier to justify in terms of society’s increased safety.

148

See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
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